Aid Volatility and Structural Economic Transformation in sub-Saharan Africa: Does Finance Matter?:Economic Research Southern Africa (ERSA) Working Paper 655 by Kumi, Emmanuel et al.
        
Citation for published version:
Kumi, E, Ibrahim, M & Yeboah, T 2017, 'Aid Volatility and Structural Economic Transformation in sub-Saharan
Africa: Does Finance Matter? Economic Research Southern Africa (ERSA) Working Paper 655' pp. 1-26.
Publication date:
2017
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication
Publisher Rights
Unspecified
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
Economic Research Southern Africa (ERSA) is a research programme funded by the National 
Treasury of South Africa.  
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the funder, ERSA or the author’s affiliated 
institution(s). ERSA shall not be liable to any person for inaccurate information or opinions contained herein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aid Volatility and Structural Economic 
Transformation in sub-Saharan Africa: 
Does Finance Matter? 
 
 
 
 
 
Emmanuel Kumi, Muazu Ibrahim & Thomas Yeboah 
 
 
 
 
 
ERSA working paper 655 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 2017 
Aid Volatility and Structural Economic
Transformation in sub-Saharan Africa: Does
Finance Matter?
Emmanuel Kumi∗, Muazu Ibrahim†& Thomas Yeboah‡
January 12, 2017
Abstract
This paper departs from the traditional aid—economic growth studies
through its examination of the impact of aid and its volatility on sec-
toral growth by relying on panel dataset of 37 sub-Saharan African (SSA)
countries for the period 1980—2014. Findings from our system generalised
methods of moments (GMM) show that, while foreign aid signiﬁcantly
drives economic transformation, aid volatility deteriorates sectoral value
additions with huge impact on the non—tradable sector and a no apparent
eﬀect on the agricultural sector. However, the deleterious eﬀect of aid
volatility on structural economic transformation in SSA is weakened by
a well—developed ﬁnancial system with a large dampening impact on the
tradable sector. Our evidence therefore provides unequivocal support for
the notion that development of domestic ﬁnancial markets enhances aid
eﬀectiveness.
Keywords: Aid, Sectoral growth, sub-Saharan Africa, Volatility
1 Introduction
To what extent does Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA) volatility aﬀect
sectoral growth in developing countries? Interrogating this question is crucial
as sustained economic growth is a necessary condition for poverty reduction and
other development outcomes. In many sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries,
where government spending is less than Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) $500
per person per year, ODA continues to be an important resource. To this end,
many SSA countries are highly dependent on ODA and it therefore comes as
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no surprise that the sub-region is the largest recipient of ODA such as country
programmable aid (CPA) in the world. For instance, the region receives about
35% of total ODA and hosts thirteen out of the twenty largest ODA recipients.
In 2012, a total of US$ 49.5 billion representing 33% of gross ODA was given
to SSA while CPA also increased signiﬁcantly by 13% between 2012 and 2013
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2015).
We deﬁne ODA as concessional assistance from oﬃcial agencies to eligible
developing countries or multilateral institutions with the purpose of promoting
economic development and welfare of the citizenry of recipient countries. We
acknowledge that there is much debate on the meaning and dimensions of aid
with much of the debates being polarised. Much of the discussions have also
focused on the altruistic values of oﬃcial agencies to the neglect of is the eco-
nomic and political rationale for disbursing aid. Aid also constitute a bundle of
things which can take the form of grants, debt reliefs, commodities and food,
mixed project aid and technical cooperation. Thus aid to developing countries
takes a combination of in-cash and in-kind transfers. Our conceptualisation of
aid in this paper is in line with the diﬀerent forms outlined.
Despite the burgeoning literature on ODA—volatility growth nexus, there is
little agreement or ﬁerce debate on the real eﬀects of aid on economic growth.
To some scholars, there is a marginal or negative relationship between ODA and
economic growth (see Young and Sheehan, 2014) due partly to donor interests
and inappropriate recipient policies. Others also demonstrate that ODA helps in
the promotion of economic growth through increases in investments and capacity
to import goods and technology, complement and supplement domestic resources
and saving as well as augment capital productivity (Hatemi and Irandoust,
2005; Easterly, 2005; Duc, 2006; Armah and Carl, 2008; Minoiu and Reddy,
2010). Thus, ODA helps in bridging the saving-investment gap confronting
many developing countries.
There is also a third of group of scholars who argue that the relationship
between aid and economic growth is mixed. To these scholars, country-level fac-
tors such as policy environment play important role in shaping the eﬀects of aid
(Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Arguing along similar lines, other commentators
maintain that in the short-run, aid promotes growth through investments and
government spending while in the long-run, trade and ﬁnancial depth has neg-
ative eﬀects on growth (Adams and Atsu, 2014). Contrarily, Minou and Reddy
(2010) have established that aid has beneﬁcial eﬀects both in the short and
long-run. This notwithstanding, these studies have faced heavy methodological
criticisms because of their emphasis on macroeconomic variables and economic
growth.
Notwithstanding the ambiguities on aid—growth nexus in the literature, what
is by far obvious is that country-speciﬁc factors or internal dynamics including ﬁ-
nancial markets, policy environments, quality of governance structures, resource
endowment, culture and socio-economic characteristics are major determinants
of the eﬀectiveness or counter productiveness of aid to growth (Nkusu and Sayek,
2004; Hansen and Tarp 2001; De La Croix and Delavallade, 2013; Young and
Sheehan, 2014; Winters and Martinez, 2015).
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The burgeoning literature on aid has mostly focused on the totality of aid
and its eﬀects on macroeconomic indicators such as economic growth to the
neglect of the eﬀects of aid volatility on speciﬁc sectors including agriculture,
services and industry. Nonetheless, analysing the sectoral impact of aid volatiity
is important as it could have serious implications on growth. For example, aid
volatility could force government to cut investments in areas including human
capital development or boost government consumption (Celasun and Walliser,
2008). Rodrik (1990) argues that aid volatility may result in volatility of ex-
penditure and policy instability especially among poor aid-dependent countries
while Mosley and Suleiman (2007) also suggest that aid volatility reduces ﬁscal
policies and coherent investment programmes in the public sector in recipient
countries. Informed by these strands of view, some commentators have ar-
gued that aid volatility negatively aﬀects the eﬀectiveness of aid at the macro-
economic level (Lensink and Morrissey, 2000) and it leads to macroeconomic
instability (Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2009).
It is worthy of note that not all aid volatility is necessarily negative because
of its association with aid windfalls and shortfalls. In this regard, Hudson and
Mosley (2008) distinguish between negative and positive volatility and their ef-
fects on economic growth determined by factors such as the failure of recipient
countries to adhere to donor conditionalities in safeguarding aid in addition
to administrative delays, changing donor priorities which results in addition or
subtraction (Celasun and Walliser, 2008). In the literature, it is often assumed
that aid ﬂow is predictable which makes it possible for recipient countries to
factor such inﬂows into their development planning because of the close elision
between aid commitment and disbursement. However, this assumption has been
far from reality because disbursed aid volumes is much more complex and dif-
fer markedly from committed aid especially in most aid dependent countries
(Hudson, 2013).
Our purpose in this paper is to go beyond the debates on aid volatility—
growth nexus and to examine the eﬀect of aid and its volatility on sectoral
outputs. Indeed, individual sectoral eﬀects of aid volatility matters in the same
manner as total aid volatility because merely regressing aid on economic growth
is not instructive, hence the need for an in-depth knowledge and understand-
ing on how individual sector is uniquely aﬀected. In this paper, we focus on
aid unpredictability disbursement relative to commitments. Negative volatility
which refers to sudden decrease or decline in aid has eﬀects on economic growth
by leading to projects postponement and disruption of government budgetary
planning (Hudson and Mosley, 2008). In this regard, the eﬀects of aid and its
volatility on structural economic transformation — deﬁned as sectoral output
value additions — deserve much scholarly attention.
It is imperative to contend that, a signiﬁcant problem in aid—growth lit-
erature is the possibility of obtaining biased results stemming from potential
endogeneity of aid in respect to growth. Indeed, donor countries may incen-
tivize a recipient country with a high level of sectoral growth by providing huge
foreign aid. Conversely, some donor countries may also wish to channel large
aid ﬂows to slow—growing poor countries (Hepp, 2008) and may also direct that
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a proportion of the inﬂows be channelled to a speciﬁc sector where they believe
intrinsically lag behind relative to other sectors. Thus, there might be a negative
association between sectoral output value additions and aid inﬂows. Simulta-
neously, if some donor countries have higher appetite for directing more aid to
fast—growing countries and more speciﬁcally certain sectors of the economy, we
expect a positive correlation between sectoral output and aid. In such frame-
work, one might anticipate the other variables perceived to inﬂuence structural
economic transformation to potentially correlate with sectoral output. Apart
from this, the majority of the active population of SSA’s labour force is more
probable to engage in agriculture thereby increasing its sectoral output and
freeing resources/inputs to other sectors notably the manufacturing. Moreover,
relatively eﬃcient sector players may demand improved institutional quality to
allow sound service delivery hence boosting income. These are potential threat
to identiﬁcation of the causal impact of agricultural output and institutions on
structural economic transformation. We resolve these potential endogeneities
by employing the system generalised methods of moments (GMM) where we
instrument with two lags of the regressors in the ﬁrst diﬀerence equation and a
one lag of their ﬁrst diﬀerence in the level equation while dealing with country—
speciﬁc eﬀects.
We contribute signiﬁcantly to literature. Incorporating aid volatility into
the standard aid—growth framework will provide an indication of the extent
to which aid vagaries may have eroded sectoral output over the period under
consideration, where the region has received substantial ODA. Undoubtedly,
our study provides a strong alternative to examining aid—growth relationship
in SSA. More speciﬁcally, our study focuses on sub-sector eﬀects of aid and
aid volatility and how ﬁnancial sector development impact on volatility—sector
output nexus. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study attempting
to quantify the unique impact of aid and its volatility of the various sectors of
SSA. In doing so, we deal with the question of whether aid and its volatility
have counteracting eﬀect on each sector. Apart from this, our study empirically
examine whether development of the ﬁnancial sector which has been low in SSA
relative to other emerging economies mitigates or ampliﬁes the potential impact
of volatility in the region’s structural economic transformation process.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents some stylised facts on
aid inﬂows in SSA while Section 3 examines the empirical literature on aid,
volatility and growth nexus. Section 4 presents the data and empirical strategy
while the penultimate section discusses the ﬁndings. Section 6 concludes the
study with some implications for policy.
2 ODA—Volatility architecture in SSA: Some styl-
ised facts
The growing emphasis on ODA in Africa can be best understood in the con-
text of the increasing poverty and under-development in the sub-region. Poverty
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ranks as one of the region’s most pressing development challenges. An estimated
48.5% of SSA’s population subsists on less than US$1.25 a day. With almost
910.4 million people, the region has, by far the highest poverty rate in the world
with about 65% of the population being multidimensionally poor (UNDP, 2011;
World Bank, 2012). This makes Africa the signiﬁer of poverty and sometimes
the connection with poverty often close to elision (Harrison, 2011). Moreover,
countries in SSA occupy most of the bottom places in many human develop-
ment indicators including life expectancy, maternal mortality and literacy rates
(UNDP, 2015) while growth rates have recorded abysmal performance over the
last four decades (Asongu, 2014).
This situation coupled with weak institutional and governance structures
has created a ‘development void’ where foreign donors including bilateral and
multilateral agencies have sought to ﬁll through the provision of ODA. The in-
stitutionalisation of aid can also be seen as a mechanism for creating interaction
between developed and less-developed countries. This is also not to downplay
the fact that donor agencies may not necessarily allocate aid ﬂow to the neediest
regions or countries but are inﬂuenced in part by their political and strategic
considerations including the rhetoric of better governance, ﬁscal sustainability
and accountability (Collier and Dollar 2002; Harrigan et al., 2006). We argue
here that conceptually aid to SSA countries can be considered as a necessary
evil. This notwithstanding SSA has remained the major recipient of aid making
aid to play a major role in the development of many countries. This has led
to what many commentators consider as Africa’s aid high dependence on donor
funding leading to what is known as a ‘dependency trap’.
Despite the rhetoric by the international donor community in ensuring aid
eﬀectiveness by making aid more predictable following the Paris Declaration
of 2005, and two other subsequent commitments: the Accra Agenda for Ac-
tion in 2008 and the Busan Partnership for Eﬀective Development Co-operation
of 2011, aid variability still continues to be a major challenge more especially
among aid-dependent countries in SSA, This is so because aid shortfalls have
dire consequences for governments in reducing the level of investments. More-
over, Celasun and Walliser (2008) argue that aid volatility is most common
among poor countries. In the same vein, Vargas (2005) notes that averagely,
the diﬀerence between aid commitments and disbursements for SSA countries
could be higher or lower by 20% of total aid commitments. In their analysis,
they found that between 1975 and 2002, total disbursement to SSA countries
fell short by 4.9%. It volatility especially in SSA countries could be inﬂuenced
in part by donor countries’ prevailing economic and political conditions while
weak institutional structures in recipient countries also play major roles. For
example, political unrest and economic meltdown in donor country could aﬀect
the smooth disbursement of aid to recipient countries and thereby lead to aid
unpredictability. On the part of recipient countries, weak systems and low ca-
pacity in the public sector could also result in not meeting donor requirements
which could also delay the disbursement process leading to unpredictability.
Many SSA including Kenya has experienced relatively unpredictable ﬂow of aid
especially since the 1980s. For example while the period 1990-2000 witnessed
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a dramatic decline in bilateral aid, the 2001-2011 period saw an increase in bi-
lateral ﬂow due to changes in regime. In this regard, commitments have been
higher than disbursements (Ojiambo et al., 2015).
Turning to economic growth performance among SSA countries, the sub-
region has experienced considerable improvement over the years. For example,
in 2013, SSA recorded an average growth rate of 5% compared to 3% for the
global economy. This has led to an improvement in the region’s medium-term
growth prospects due in part to social and political stability at home as well as
recovering global economic situations (AfDB, 2015). The growth experienced
in recent years has led a new narrative of ‘Africa rising’, Africa emerges and
‘African Growth Miracle’ by some commentators (Young, 2012; Rotberg, 2013).
However, Taylor (2016) cautions against such sweeping generations because they
tend to ignore the deep structural challenges facing SSA including under devel-
opment. He further maintains that beyond the growth ﬁgures, Africa is actually
deepening its structural dependent position on the global economy while social
exclusion and income inequality is also on the ascendency.
3 ODA—Volatility—Growth Nexus: Situating the
debates and ambiguities
In this paper, although a comprehensive review of the literature on ODA-
volatility-growth is beyond the scope, we however, review some key contributors.
The results on aid-growth nexus have been mixed without any robust and con-
clusive evidence.1 For the purpose of this paper, we classify the literature into
three strands. This is a departure from the polarised literature.
Most studies examining the eﬀects of aid on growth points ﬁnd that aid
has positive eﬀects on the economic growth of recipient countries (Clemens et
al., 2012; Bruckner, 2013). This positive impact of aid on growth is achieved
through domestic capital formation supplementation (Hansen and Tarp, 2001),
public investment and human capital development. According to Morrissey
(2001) and McGillivray (2009), aid contributes to economic development by
way of increasing physical and human capital investment and also provides
an opportunity to import capital goods and technology in recipient countries.
In many SSA countries where the relatively lack of growth is partly due to
shortage of capital, foreign aid plays much important role by bridging the gap
between savings and investments as well as imports and exports (Chervin and
van Wijnbergen, 2010).
An aspect of the aid-growth literature that has recent little attention relates
to the eﬀects of sectoral aid growth. This notwithstanding, Kaya et al. (2008)
using a dataset of 112 developing countries between 1974 to 2005 found that aid
to the agricultural sector resulted in value addition which signiﬁcantly increased
economic growth. For some scholars, aid contributes to eﬀective governance and
democratic structures (Heckelman and Knack, 2008). Poor governance is also
1See for example Clemens et al. (2004) for details on the literature on aid-growth nexus.
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found to negatively aﬀects aid ﬂows (Young and Sheehan, 2014; Winters and
Martinez, 2015). It is worth noting that the extent of aid eﬀectiveness depends
in part on good economic and governance policies of recipient countries. Thus,
prevailing policy environments play major role in determining aid eﬀectiveness.
However, this assumption has received a number of critiques (Hansen and Tarp,
2001; Hudson and Mosley, 2001). For instance, Hansen and Tarp (2001) argue
that aid increases economic growth but with diminishing returns irrespective of
the policy environment.
On the other hand, other commentators argue that aid is detrimental to eco-
nomic growth because of its tendency to create a ‘dependency trap’ for recipient
countries. In some context, it could also lead to crowding out the development
of the private sector in addition to lowering competitiveness through the Dutch
disease. This results in negative impact especially on traded goods and growth
in in recipient countries (Rajan and Subramanian, 2011). Arguing along similar
lines, Duc (2006) using a sample of 39 developing between 1975 and 2000 found a
signiﬁcant negative relationship between aid and economic growth. Some schol-
ars even go further to dismiss completely the eﬀects of aid on growth because
of ineﬀectiveness caused in part by aid fungibility. The reverse causality eﬀect
of aid on growth has received copious treatment in the literature (see Rajan
and Subramanian, 2008). As mentioned earlier, aid dependency has a greater
tendency of undermining institutional quality and increasing collusive and rent
seeking behaviour in recipient countries (Asongu, 2012; 2013). To this end, the
negative result is largely explained by political economy dynamics. Another
important factor has to do with the usage of the aid money (i.e. consumption
or investment). For example, Bearce (2008) maintains that in countries where
aid is consumed rather than invested, the eﬀects tend to negative. Similarly,
Arellano et al. (2009) examined the eﬀects of aid volatility on consumption,
investment and structure of production and found that the continuous inﬂows
of aid were used for consumption which resulted in signiﬁcant welfare losses.
The results of the eﬀect of aid on investment have also received mixed results
in the literature (see Easterly, 1999; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Clements et al.,
2004).
An aspect of aid volatility that has received little attention in the literature
relates its sector speciﬁc eﬀects. Hudson (2012) maintains that most studies
tend to focus on the totality of aid or its macro level eﬀects. For example, some
studies point to a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on macro level variables including
growth. According to Kodama (2012), aid unpredictability leads to about one-
ﬁfth of aid being wasted while Bulır and Hamann (2008) using a sample of 76
countries between 1975 to 2003 found that aid volatility is much bigger than
GDP volatility, increases over time and is unpredictable. Hudson and Mosley
(2008) argue that aid volatility negatively aﬀects economic growth of recipient
countries depending on the level of aid. For this reason, they distinguish between
negative and positive volatility. Bulir and Hamann (2008) also found that in
both heavily and less heavily aid-dependent countries, aid volatility inﬂow makes
it diﬃcult in managing the macro economy. Due to the procyclical nature of
aid, it has failed to either act as a macroeconomic stabilizer or an insurance
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mechanism. Contrary, Hudson and Mosley (2008) found no evidence of high
aid volatility in heavily aid-dependent countries but volatility declines as aid-
to-revenue ratio increases. The impact of aid volatility on economic growth
is much more complex and extends beyond the income-consumption nexus to
include other variables such as policy maker’s decision and wage levels.
It is worth noting that although the vast literature on aid volatility is silent
on sectoral eﬀects, it is only recent that Hudson (2015) has examined the eﬀects
of aid and aid volatility on speciﬁc sectors using database of 50 sectors from the
OECD Creditor Reporting System. He found that when debt and humanitarian
aid are ignored, the most volatile sectors are linked to government and industry
but other social sectors including health and education have low volatilities.
This notwithstanding, much of the literature tends to forget that aid is meant
to target speciﬁc projects or sectors. In worst scenarios, they treat all aid as the
same but this has been criticized at great length by Clements et al (2004). For
this reason Wolf (2007) in analysing the eﬀects of aid volatility and its volume
on health, education as well as water and sanitation sectors found that the share
of aid on these sector speciﬁc outcomes was positive but overall aid impact was
negative.
Ferro et al. (2014) have also studied the eﬀects of aid to the services sector
and its eﬀects on manufacturing exports. They found that in general aid to
the services sector (especially transports and energy) has positive eﬀects on
downstream manufacturing exports for developing countries.
In summary, the results of the extant studies on aid-growth nexus are still
inconclusive due to the use of aggregate growth measure. However, we argue
that such measurements are not informative as aid and its volatility potentially
impact on growth through the various sectors. Put diﬀerently, while earlier
studies have provided evidence of aid—growth nexus, little is known on how
aid and its associated vagaries uniquely impact on each sectoral output. It
is therefore imperative to separate the diﬀerent sectoral eﬀect of aid and how
each sector is aﬀected by ﬂuctuations in aid inﬂows. Given this, the study
hypothesizes that deeper ﬁnancial sector should dampen the negative eﬀect
of aid volatility of output. More speciﬁcally, well—developed ﬁnancial sectors
if associated with healthy levels of private credit can play a critical role in
mitigating the possible crowding—out eﬀects of aid on emanating from excessive
aid ﬂuctuations.
4 Data and Methodology
4.1 Data
To test our hypothesis, we construct a panel dataset of 37 SSA countries for the
period 1980—2014.2 The choice of these countries is based entirely on data avail-
2These countries are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Burundi,
Congo, Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dem. Rep., Ethiopia,
Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, The, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius,
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ability for a suﬃciently longer time period. Annual data for all the variables
were gleaned from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank.
We used ODA to GDP ratio to proxy foreign aid. We follow Dabla—Norris et
al. (2013) and proxy the degree of economic transformation by the real value
added output in agriculture, service and manufacturing. Speciﬁcally, value ad-
dition in the agricultural sector is the net output of a sector after adding up
all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs while that of the service sector
include value added in wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and restau-
rants), transport, and government, ﬁnancial, professional, and personal services
such as education, health care, and real estate services. Industrial sector value
added which comprises of value additions in manufacturing, mining, construc-
tion, electricity, water and gas. Indeed, sectoral value additions are computed
as the net output of a sector after summing all outputs and subtracting inter-
mediate inputs. The origin of value added is determined by the International
Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (ISIC), revision 3 and annual growth rate for
all sectors are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. We present the distribution
of aid and the various sectoral outputs in the Appendix. We used credit provided
by ﬁnancial sector to the private sector as percentage of GDP to proxy the qual-
ity of ﬁnancial development. Our control variables are based on the standard
neoclassical growth theory and include inﬂation, investment rate, government
expenditure, institutional quality, labour and trade openness. The inﬂation
variable is the annual percentage change in the consumer price index and used
to proxy macroeconomic (in)stability. This is expected to negatively impact on
economic transformation. We use gross ﬁxed capital formation as a percentage
of GDP to proxy investment rates and this is expected to positively inﬂuence
structural economic transformation. Government expenditure expressed as a
percentage of GDP measures ﬁnal government consumption expenditure and
used to measure government size. The institutional quality variable is a contin-
uous variable ranging from 0 to 4, with a higher score indicating a better quality.
Obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), this is used to
measure the quality of government institutions that aﬀect property rights or the
ability to conduct business. Labour is proxied by the percentage of economically
active population aged 15 to 64 years.
4.2 Modelling aid volatility
Some authors (see for instance, Chervin and van Wijnbergen, 2010; Markandya
et al., 2010; Ojiambo et al., 2015) have used the standard deviations where aid
volatility is measured according to the degree to it deviates along the mean
trend. However, this measure assumes that, aid inﬂows is normally distrib-
uted empirically and obscures the distribution between unpredictable elements
of the aid process hence failing to capture the past information of aid inﬂow.
We therefore estimate a time—varying volatility on account of the weaknesses of
Malawi, Nigeria, Niger, Namibia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Zambia.
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the traditional standard deviation measure. In this study, we rely on the gen-
eralised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) developed by
Bollerslev (1986) largely because it captures past values of the aid and corrects
for the intrinsic weaknesses of the traditional measure. Similar to Alagidede
and Ibrahim (2016), we allow the log of aid to depend on its previous value for
the mean equation, we derive our GARCH model as follows:
InAIDt = α1 + β
|InAIDt−1 + εt (1)
εt | Ωt ∼ iidN(0, ϑt)
ϑt = ℵ0 + τµ
2
t−1 + θϑt−1 (2)
where ℵ0 > 0, τ ≥ 0 and θ ≥ 0
Therefore, our conditional variance ht captures the mean (ℵ0), information
about the previous volatility, ε2t−1 (ARCH term) and the past forecast error
variance, ϑt−1 (GARCH term). Our GARCH model permits the error term to
assume a time—varying variance contingent on the past behaviour of aid inﬂows.
4.3 Empirical strategy
Empirically, regression models are used to study the relationship between aid
and growth. Following this, we specify equation (3) below where sectoral growth
depends on the level of aid inﬂows and other conditioning variables.
SECit = f(AIDit, V OLit, Zit, εit) (3)
where SECit is sector growth of country i at time t; AIDit,is aid; V OLit
is aid volatility Zit is a vector of control variables; εit is the error term while t
and i are time and country indices respectively.
We examine the sectoral eﬀect of aid and aid volatility by setting a baseline
model where sector growth depends on its one period lag, aid and its volatility
and a set of controls estimated in equation (4) below;
SECit = β0SECit−1 + β1AIDit + β2V OLit + β3Zit + γi + µt + εit (4)
where SECit−1 is the sector growth lag representing the initial conditions;
γi is the country—speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects; µt is the time eﬀects while εit is the
idiosyncratic error term. We estimate equation (4) above by emplying the sys-
tem generalized methods of moments (GMM) dynamic pooled estimator as it
resolves the econometric problems inspired by endogeneity of the lagged depen-
dent (SECit−1) as well as potential unobserved country—speciﬁc eﬀects. Since
all the regressors may be endogenous, we instrument with two lags of themselves
in the ﬁrst diﬀerence equation, and a one lag of their ﬁrst diﬀerence in the level
equation. We investigate the channels through which ﬁnancial development
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magniﬁes or dampens aid volatility eﬀect on sector growth by including a mul-
tiplicative interaction term of V OLit and ﬁnancial development. Consequently,
we specify our general system GMM framework from equation (4) as:
SECit =
p
k=1
γkSECit−k + α1AIDit + α1V OLit + α1(V OLit × FDit) (5)
+Zitβ + ǫit
t = p+ 1, . . . . . . . . . , T ; i = 1, 2, . . . . . . N
ǫit = γi + µt + εit
where β is the vector of parameters associated with each explanatory vari-
able; p is the maximum lag in the model; FDit is ﬁnancial development. The
other variable remain as previously deﬁned.
In order for the equation to be estimable, there is a restriction on the ser-
ial correlation of the error term which requires it to be uncorrelated with the
explanatory variables. This condition has both economic and statistical mean-
ing. Economically, it means that the instrumental variables only aﬀect sectoral
growth through their eﬀect on the explanatory variables. Statistically, the con-
dition means that our set of explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. In
other words, they can be aﬀected by current and past realizations of sector
vale additions but must not be correlated with the future realizations of the
error term. Thus, from equation (5), we write an arbitrary time period T for a
random country i as:
SECi = Viψ + λiγi + ǫit (6)
where ψ is a vector of γi’s, αk’s and β
′s; Vi is a vector containing the initial
conditions and all the explanatory variables (M ’s) while λi is a T × 1 vectors
of unity.
By employing the dynamic pooled panel, we compute the linear GMM esti-
mators of ψ with a general form equation speciﬁed in equation (7) below:
ψˆ =

i
V
∗|
i Xi

MN

i
XV ∗i
−1
i
V
∗|
i Xi

MN

i
X
|
iy
∗
i

(7)
where MN =

i
X
|
iΓiXi
−1
V ∗i and y
∗
i are transformations of Vi and γi’s, ak’s and β’s; Vi and yi respectively;
Xi is a matrix of instrumental variables while Γi is the country—speciﬁc weight-
ing matrix.
Our panel estimator relying on pooled cross—country and time series proper-
ties while utilizing additional information provided by the variations in the level
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of sectoral growth and associated factors inﬂuencing it. Thus, the added infor-
mation from this property by far provides more precision in the estimations
as well as correcting for biases beset with existing studies on the aid—growth
nexus. Thus, the added information from this property by far provides more
precision in the estimations as well as correcting for biases beset with existing
literature on aid—growth eﬀects. Following from this approach, equation (5) can
be estimated using the ﬁrst diﬀerence or system GMM and consequently, from
equation (5), we rewrite the sectoral growth model as:
SECit = θ1SECit−1 + θ2Wit + eit (8)
Since the unobserved country—speciﬁc (γi) eﬀect contained in eit may be
correlated with other explanatory variables, we ﬁrst diﬀerence equation (8) to
eliminate this eﬀect thus giving equation (9) below:
△SECit = θ1(△SECit) + θ2(△Wit) + (△eit) (9)
By assuming uncorrelated error terms and weak exogeneity property of the
explanatory variables, for our GMM dynamic panel estimations, we use the
system GMM to of yield consistent and unbiased estimates because the ﬁrst
diﬀerence GMM has very poor ﬁnite properties both in terms of bias and preci-
sion especially when the explanatory variables are persistent overtime as their
lagged values are weak instruments and predictors of endogenous changes (Arel-
lano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). By using the system GMM, we
employ extra moment conditions for the regression in levels are given as follows:
E[SECit−s − SECit−s−1(γi + εit)] = 0 for s = 1 (10)
E[Wit−s −Wit−s−1(γi + εit)] = 0 for s = 1 (11)
We address the validity of the instruments by using two (2) formal tests:
serial correlation test and Sargan’s test for over—identifying restriction. While
the serial correlation test examines the null hypothesis that the error term is
serially uncorrelated (whether ﬁrst, AR(1) or second order, AR(2)), the Sargan’s
test examines the exogeneity of the instruments with the null hypothesis that
over—identifying restrictions are valid.
5 Results and Discussions
This section presents the empirical ﬁndings on aid—volatility—sectoral value ad-
ditions nexus. Speciﬁcally, we regress structural economic transformations prox-
ied by real value additions of agriculture, service and industrial sector on their
one period lag together with aid, aid volatility and other standard controls se-
lected with recourse to standard literature. We also include the multiplicative
interactive term of aid volatility and ﬁnancial sector development. To eliminate
time and country level heterogeneity in the structural economic transformation
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process, our estimations include time and country eﬀect dummies and results
from the system GMM are presented in Table 1 below.
Conditional convergence hypothesizes that economies have a penchant of
converging toward a steady—state path (Solow, 1956). In this study, we argue
that sectoral output growth in SSA will depend on the initial value additions.
Following this logic, we capture the conditional convergence eﬀects by including
the initial/lagged output levels of agriculture, service and manufacturing sec-
tors in their respective models. From Table 1, the coeﬃcient of the respective
lagged dependent of each sector is negative and signiﬁcant at conventional levels
predicting a convergence of sectoral output to a stable equilibrium.
Columns 1 and 2 present ﬁndings on how the independent variables aﬀect
real value additions of the agriculture sector. The coeﬃcient of gross ﬁxed
capital formation is positive for all sectors but its eﬀect on agricultural value
addition is not signiﬁcant. With regard to the service sector, our ﬁnding suggests
that a unit percentage increase in investment rate increases its value addition
by 0.078% compared to 0.081% of the manufacturing sector. This ﬁnding is
unsurprising as investment in capital build up is expected to boost infrastructure
thus paving way for the expansion in both sectors. The eﬀect of ﬁscal policy
proxied by government expenditure is positive albeit insigniﬁcantly suggesting
that government expenditure does not matter in economic transformation.
This argument is well illustrated in Ibrahim and Alagidede (2017, forth-
coming) where the authors opine that government expenditure in SSA is often
on boondoggles and white elephants. More importantly, award of government
contracts are usually based on corrupt relationships rather than on merit cul-
minating in shoddy works with no impact on economic growth.
In terms of the eﬀect of macroeconomic instability proxied by inﬂation, our
results indicate that increases in inﬂation is associated with reduced value addi-
tions in all the sectors. While macroeconomic instability is generally unhealthy,
the eﬀect on manufacturing value additions is dire given the rather high (in ab-
solute) elasticity of manufacturing value additions with respect to ﬂuctuations
in inﬂation. This result in practice appears plausible. Increases in inﬂation
decrease the purchasing power of individuals therefore reducing their demand
for goods and services with a concomitant eﬀect on supply side production.
This ultimately is expected to reduce values additions thwarting the process
of economic transformation. Turning to the eﬀect of international openness
on structural economic transformation, our ﬁndings suggest that, de-restricting
trade barriers can potentially increase value additions in all sectors with large
eﬀects in the manufacturing (column 5). Our ﬁnding follows the fact that the
booming industrial sector in SSA is largely attributed to the rising competi-
tion stemming from higher trade openness which has paved the way for trading
in goods and services thereby increasing output in each sector. Perhaps, the
increasing competition among sector players in SSA and the rest of the world
has promoted innovation among sectors in the region. Indeed, the likelihood
of sectors to leap-frog in terms of technology also permits their production at
reduced cost thereby reducing their cost of production and increasing sectoral
output.
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The eﬀect of labour in output growth is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
suggesting that increasing population in region is associated with higher eco-
nomic transformation. Further ﬁndings show that higher institutional quality is
output-enhancing. Speciﬁcally, increase in the quality of institutions promotes
value additions in agriculture, service and the manufacturing sectors. Apart
from enhancing capacity, improvement in institutions alleviates structural bot-
tlenecks inhibiting sectoral productivity ultimately spurring output.
On aid—sectoral growth nexus, we ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect of aid on agricultural output suggesting that aid inﬂows to SSA propels
agricultural output. Similarly, foreign aid is also associated with higher service
and manufacturing output. Thus, foreign aid inﬂows propel structural economic
transmission and may well reveal the interdependence of the various sectors in
the production process. While the agricultural sector provides the inputs nec-
essary for production while service sector provides the intermediation role by
creating a sound enabling the environment for manufacturing to thrive. In-
deed, those manufacturing industries that rely more heavily on service sector
beneﬁt from the eﬃcient transportation services, ICT, energy and other service
provision thereby spurring manufacturing output. Thus, apart from propelling
agricultural sector production, the positive impact of aid suggests improvement
in service provision permitting downstream users of these services. Notice that
the eﬀect of aid on agricultural output is large and increases substantially with
a rather reduced magnitude on manufacturing. We attribute this to the high
concentration of agriculture where additional resources potentially increase pro-
duction. Deﬁned as an income transfer to governments, to the extent that for-
eign aid permits increased public spending and investment, these ﬁndings are
particularly apt as eﬃciency in services (dis)proportionally beneﬁts all sectors
although the output—enhancing eﬀect on manufacturing is low perhaps due to
the nascent manufacturing sector.
We control for the direct eﬀect of aid volatility on sectoral output and results
are shown in columns 2, 4 and 6. Our ﬁndings show a negative impact of aid
volatility on agricultural, service and manufacturing output. The implication
is that while aid promotes growth in these sectors, excessive vagaries in aid
dampen its enhancing—eﬀect. However, this eﬀect is statistically insigniﬁcant in
the agricultural sector. Although the coeﬃcient of aid volatility is negative and
signiﬁcant (at 5%) for service and manufacturing sectors, its eﬀect is huge in the
former. These ﬁndings suggest that revenue volatility deteriorates output and
can potentially present severe problems to developing economies like those in
SSA. As argued by Mosley and Suleiman (2007), government of recipient coun-
try’s capacity to execute productive investments and ﬁscal policies is inhibited
by excessive aid ﬂuctuations. With the revenue inﬂows of which a high propor-
tion goes to poor countries as aid, ﬂuctuations in aid may result in volatility
of expenditure and instability of policy (Rodrick, 1990). Overall, our ﬁndings
could explain why countries in SSA have made little progress transforming their
structure despite the ODA inﬂows.
While this holds, evidence from our study suggests that volatility eﬀect of aid
on agriculture is insigniﬁcant. Thus, relative to service and manufacturing, the
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agricultural sector is immune from the adverse eﬀects of unpredictable pattern
of aid. This ﬁnding is akin to Chauvet and Guillaumont (2009). The author’s
show that aid, even if aid is volatile, it is not as procyclical as is often argued,
and, even if procyclical, it is not necessarily destabilizing with the (de)stabilizing
nature of aid measured by the diﬀerence in the volatility of (i) exports and (ii)
aid plus export ﬂows. To the extent that agricultural sector in SSA is not into
mainstream exports but provides inputs for other sectors in the processing and
exporting sector perhaps explains the subtle eﬀect of volatility. On the policy
front, this ﬁnding highlights the need to not assume that aid volatility will have
the same eﬀects across diﬀerent sectors of the economy. While volatility may
not have signiﬁcant eﬀect on one sector (such as agriculture), it may have a
relatively smaller negative eﬀect on one sector (such as service) hindering its
improvement, while at the same time have negative and large eﬀect on other
sectors (such as manufacturing).
Given the negative eﬀects of volatility on economic transformation in SSA,
this study hypothesizes that, improvements in domestic ﬁnancial sector falters
aid vagaries. We test this hypothesis by including a multiplicative interactive
term of volatility and ﬁnancial development proxied by credit to the private
sector. Consistent with our hypothesis, we ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient of the
interactive term suggesting that countries with well—developed ﬁnancial sectors
are associated with lower volatility. This ﬁnding is somewhat akin to Nkusu and
Sayek (2004). A plausible explanation from this study may be that, because
aid provides more resources to governments of the recipient countries reduces
their appetite to compete with the private sector for credit from the domestic
ﬁnancial sector thereby freeing credit to the private sector. However, dampening
eﬀect of ﬁnancial development is insigniﬁcant in the agricultural sector. Indeed,
countries in SSA have high comparative advantage in agriculture (see Collier and
Venables, 2007) and with majority of the agriculture-based economies having
agriculture contribution to GDP and manufacturing sector output respectively
averaging 34% (Hayami, 2005) and 61% (GAIF, 2008).
This notwithstanding, commercial banks in SSA lend less than 10% of their
total credit to the agricultural sector with the exception of Malawi, Tanzania
and Uganda (Mhlanga, 2010). However, manufacturing and industrial sectors
are seen as sound destinations for bank lending because they are insulated from
the inherent challenges faced by the agriculture sector. Agriculture creates spe-
cial challenges for ﬁnancial institutions due to its spatial and risk characteristics
(see Meyer, 2011; Antonaci et al., 2014). However, ﬁnancial sector programmes
aimed at ameliorating these problems produced disappointing results (Meyer,
2015) on the back of under—developed ﬁnancial sector (Ibrahim and Alagidede,
2017, forthcoming). Thus, the inability of the region’s ﬁnancial sector develop-
ment to tame volatility in the agricultural sector is unsurprising.
Turning to the other independent variables, after controlling for volatility
and indirect channels, investment does not appear to impact on agricultural
output (column 2) but has a robust positive eﬀect on service and manufactur-
ing sectors (columns 4 and 6). The eﬀect of government expenditure on sectoral
growth is largely positive albeit insigniﬁcantly expect in the service sector which
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is slightly signiﬁcant at 10%. Macroeconomic instability is damages economic
transformation given the negative and robust eﬀect on sectoral output. This
ﬁnding suggests that maintaining a stable macroeconomic environment is cru-
cial in structural economic transformation in SSA. The eﬀect of trade openness
is insensitive to model speciﬁcation given the robust positive eﬀect on output.
Beyond promoting competition, openness to international markets allows tech-
nological transfer permitting sectors to produce goods and services at lower unit
costs. Labour as an input in production process is maintains its positive sign
whether or not we control for volatility and interaction term of ﬁnance and
volatility. Institutional quality is strong and positive re—emphasizing the im-
portance of improved institutional capacity and frameworks in transformational
growth and development in SSA.
We turn to the reliability of the results. More speciﬁcally, the p—values of the
Wald chi square statistic shows jointly signiﬁcance of the all the regressors in
the each model. Results from our diagnostic checks rejected the null hypotheses
for the Sagan’s tests thus supporting the validity of the instruments. Our test
s for ﬁrst [AR(1)] and second [AR(2)] order—correlation show absence of ﬁrst—
order serial correlation and the presence of AR(2) given the high (low) p—values
(z—values). Conclusively, our ﬁndings provide consistent and unbiased estimates
given the valid instruments.
5.0.1 Conclusion and Policy Implications
Our purpose in this paper was to go beyond the debates on aid volatility—growth
nexus and to examine the eﬀect of aid and aid vagaries on structural economic
transformations proxied by sectoral value additions. More importantly, indi-
vidual sectoral eﬀect of aid volatility matters in the same manner as total aid
volatility because merely regressing aid on economic growth is not instructive.
This paper therefore examined the eﬀect of aid and its volatility on structural
economic transformation in SSA using on a panel dataset of 37 countries for the
period 1980—2014. We resolve potential endogeneities in aid—sectoral growth
nexus by employing the system generalised methods of moments (GMM) while
dealing with country-speciﬁc eﬀects. Our ﬁndings show a positive and signiﬁcant
impact of aid on agricultural, service and manufacturing output suggesting that
aid inﬂows to SSA propels economic transformation. In other words, foreign in-
ﬂows spur both the tradable and non—tradable sectors revealing some degree of
interdependence. This notwithstanding, aid volatility deteriorates sectoral value
additions with huge impact on the non—tradable sector. However, excessive aid
vagaries do not appear to impact on the agricultural sector. The immunity of
this sector from the ravages of the unpredictable pattern of aid can be attributed
to the comparative advantage the region already enjoys hence any volatility in
aid inﬂows does not seem to matter for agricultural output. Consistent with our
hypothesis, the damaging eﬀect of aid volatility on structural economic trans-
formation in SSA is weakened by a well-developed ﬁnancial system with a large
dampening impact on the tradable sector (such as manufacturing) and a no ap-
parent inﬂuence on agriculture. To the extent that aid provides more resources
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to governments of the recipient countries by far reduces the crowding out of
the private sector stemming from government borrowing from ﬁnancial sector
consequently freeing credit to the private sector.
The main thrust of this paper is that, aid can generate positive economic
transformation conditioned on the level of local ﬁnancial sector. Our empiri-
cal evidence provides unequivocal support for the notion that development of
domestic ﬁnancial markets by far enhances aid eﬀectiveness. With this, the pa-
per unearths critical ﬁndings that call for further development of local ﬁnancial
systems. What is needed is for Central banks of SSA countries to identify the
threshold of ﬁnancial development consistent with sectoral growth
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Table 1: Aid, Aid Volatility and sectoral growth effects 
 
Variables 
Agriculture Service Manufacturing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Lagged 
dependent 
–1.412(0.191)* –1.222(0.294)* –1.019(0.311)* –1.537(0.275)* –1.102(0.129)* –1.871(0.231)* 
Investment 0.052(0.033) 0.043(0.039) 0.071(0.023)** 0.078(0.029)** 0.081(0.033)** 0.093(0.071)* 
Government 
size 
0.021(0.017) 0.019(0.013) 0.051(0.041) 0.062(0.031)*** 0.077(0.058) 0.061(0.049) 
Inflation –0.009(0.002)* –0.018(0.006)** –0.016(0.004)* –0.022(0.003)* –0.071(0.011)* –0.062(0.009)* 
Trade openness 0.151(0.069)** 0.172(0.040)* 0.193(0.070)** 0.110(0.050)*** 0.241(0.041)* 0.216(0.035)* 
Labour 0.090(0.028)* 0.079(0.039)** 0.071(0.034)** 0.082(0.041)** 0.086(0.043)*** 0.129(0.063)** 
Institutional 
quality 
0.099(0.016)* 0.171(0.028)* 0.073(0.031)** 0.091(0.020)* 0.087(0.019)* 0.096(0.022)* 
Aid  0.109(0.010)* 0.175(0.037)* 0.016(0.008)*** 0.0970(0.046)** 0.026(0.009)** 0.033(0.012)** 
Aid volatility  –0.018(0.014) – –0.051(0.019)** – –0.041(0.013)** 
Channels:       
Volatility and 
fin. dev’t 
 –0.031(0.024)  –0.048(0.017)**  –0.055(0.013)* 
Diagnostics:       
No. of 
countries 
37 37 37 37 37 37 
Country fixed 
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) z–value 
[p–value] 
–3.023 [0.009] –3.129[0.005] –3.209[0.002] –3.514 [0.001] –3.477 [0.009] –3.096 [0.004] 
AR(2) z–value 
[p–value] 
–1.319 [0.317] –1.422[0.419] –1.111[0.731] –1.931[0.549] –1.501 [0.301] –1.152[0.211] 
Sagan chi-
square [p–
value] 
10.091[0.241] 11.715[0.312] 14.018[0.414] 10.192[0.327] 12.312[0.410] 15.442[0.291] 
Wald chi-
square [p–
value] 
0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. All variables are estimated in logs and coefficients are their 
respective elasticities. 
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Figure 1: Foreign aid volatility 
 
 
Source: Authors’ construct using WDI. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Foreign aid and agricultural sector [Average: 1983 – 2014] 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Foreign aid and manufacturing sector [Average: 1983 – 2014] 
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Appendix C: Foreign aid and service sector [Average: 1983 – 2014] 
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